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Victor Hugo once wrote that there is nothing as powerful in
the world as an idea whose time has come. I wish to consider
with you one such idea.
Some of us who have been around medicine for some time
are developing mixed feelings about our profession. Around
major medical centers, one cannot but share in the excitement
that scintillates from the laboratories and clinics whose evernovel gadgetry and techniques offer increasing prospects of
the control of many of man's ancient physical foes. It is
awesome to contemplate the pace with which this is taking
place. It is ever more difficult even to be aware of everything
that is tumbling out onto the stage of our medical lives, let
alone develop the skills for utilizing that knowledge in the
day-to-day care of patients. And so by necessity specialties
divide like cells into subspecialties and they in turn into subsub specialties and into metaspecialties, and sometimes it is
hard not to experience a touch of anxiety over whether the
growing organism is exceeding its controls like some vast
Andromeda strain.
And so there is mingled with the excitement a certain
foreboding. There is also nostalgia and a sense of loss. It is
hard sometimes to contemplate the gleaming stainless steel,
polyethylene, and chrome of the present without wondering
whether the golden age of medicine may have already slipped
through our fingers into the past-a golden age when the
doctor was the most beloved and respected professional in our
society; when his was the role little boys and little girls could

dream about playing "when they grew up"; when he was more
a member of the family than a businessman or ivory tower
scientist; a man trusted to do his best for you even ifhe wasn't
God. In retrospect, he could have benefited from a bit more
of science. He sometimes did some pretty "dumb" things to
people medically, but he also did some wonderfully humane
things and we are all the worse for his passing.
What happened? A lot of things. The world changed.
People changed. The nostalgia is also one for a golden age of
patients. Remember, you graybeards, when patients were
loyal year after year-even generation after generation? But
mobility has changed all of that. Who now can speak of
"generation after generation" or even "year after year?" All
kinds of people who used to live together in reasonaby stable
configurations are now racing around rootless in every direction. We have become what Alvin Toffler called "citizens of
the age of transience."
Ours is an age of fantastic mobility. According to
Buckminster Fuller, the typical American of 1914 averaged
about 1,640 miles per year of total travel counting 1,300 miles
of just plain everyday walking to and fro; to the kitchen, to the
bathroom (or outhouse), out to the lawn to pick up the paper,
around the shop, to the store. This meant he traveled only
about 350 miles per year with the aid of a horse or mechanical
contrivance. In his lifetime he would travel about 88,560
miles. By contrast the present American covers some ten to
twenty thousand miles per year. By the time he dies, he will
have traveled between three and four million miles-more
than thirty times the total of his 1914 counterpart.
In a typical year nearly thirty-seven million Americans (not
counting children under one year) change their place of
residence. In every year since 1948, one out of five Americans
changed his address. In seventy major American cities the
average residence is less than four years. For literally thouContinued on page 2
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sands of Americans, home has become "where you find it."
This sense of the transitory is further enhanced by the
increasing brevity of our encounters with other people. We
used to be able to depend upon certain social configurations
as more or less enduring-the family, for example. The rising
divorce rate and various family experiments have seriously
threatened this continuity. One's neighborhood friends;
even service people in the community, the grocer, the mailman, the barber, the physician, could once be counted on year
after year-but now we briefly touch people, quickly, superficially, then hurry on.
In the process of all this change there has occurred a shift in
the image many physicians have of their roles. Let me put it
in the framework of a concept of "agency."
Time was when a physician thought of himself or herself as
being the patient's "agent" -not in the sense of merely
becoming a manipulated servant of patient wants and whims.
Rather, the physician saw himself or herself as the agent of the
patient's best interests-even if patients didn't always perceive what those interests were. In short, his care was patientcentered.
This sense of patient-agency now appears to be changing.
From being agent to the patient's highest interests, the
physician has become to a large extent, I'm afraid, agent to
himself. The patient-healing motive has largely been re-
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placed by an income motive and physician's services have
become geared to turning a profit-based on whatever the
market will bear-and in the process the profession bids fair
to become a business just like any other business. Something
has been lost in transition.
And now with resulting skyrocketing medical costs far
outstripping the national rate of inflation, a third concept of
agency is about to be thrust upon us: the physician as an agent
of the government. The kids are already starting to dream
other dreams.
There is probably no way to counter the social forces that
have brought us to this state of affairs. As population increases
and the social structure becomes ever more complicated, it
appears almost inevitable that government is going to become
bigger, more centralized-and more meddlesome. Nor is
there likelihood that in the very near future we are to become
less mobile as a people. Probably just the opposite, unless we
suddenly run out of gasoline, which seems to be down the
road apiece.
The question is, "Is there anything we can do about these
trends?" In searching for the answer to this question, we
would do well to reexamine some underlying assumptions. It
is time to develop not only a science of medicine or an ethic
of medicine but a theology of medicine.
The phrase "theology of medicine" suggests a theological
point of departure from which medicine as a clinical disci pline
may proceed to its task. As I surveyed the options, I first
thought of eschatology as that point because it has to do with
"finishing the work." Next I selected soteriology, the doctrine of salvation. There is a certain logic to that choice since
medicine has to do with healing, making persons whole,
"binding up the broken." The word "salvation" derives from
the Latin, salvus, from which we also r~-ceive our word salve.
To save is to salve, and heal and whole have a common
etymology.
But the more I thought about it, the more I realized that the
doctrine of salvation itself is a subset of a higher concept, the
doctrine of creation. To be saved is to experience recreation.
"Create in me a clean heart," cried the Psalmist, and Paul
notes that in Christ I may become a "new creature."
And so I have chosen to base my theology of medicine on
the doctrine of creation. I do not wish to elaborate what this
means in extensive detail, but I will present a few of the
implications of this choice. The doctrine of creation posits in
main outline a Creator, temporally and logically prior to every
creature. It thus stands in opposition to every attempt to grant
creaturely ultimacy. In our present terms, to be an agent of
the Creator is to place into subservience every other kind of
agency, patient, self or institution.
Consider patient-agency, for example. Creator-agency equi ps
one to deal lovingly with all patients in spite of their unloveworthy characteristics or the brevity of one's contacts
with them. The love-as-principle derived from Creatoragency does not require that the objects of healing or love be
loveworthy or that they even be our friends.
Zama Cunningham described an elderly woman she cared
for as a patient as "a terrible old creature, vain and cruel."
When asked why she took care of her all of those years, she
replied, "She needed someone all the more just because she
was vain and cruel. Her loneliness and poverty weren't any
the less for that. If you love people you have to take care of
Continued on page 5
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Medical Futility:
A Value-Dependent
Concept
By 1?()Judd B. .1Iiller. 11/./).*

Futile therap'y was recently defined by Lawrence
Schneiderman, Nancy Jecker, and Albert Jonsen of the University of Washington as a therapy "that is predictably or
empirically very unlikely to achieve the goal for which the
therapy is given, though it is possible and plausible for the
therapy to achieve the goal."(1) They go on to say, "In
judging futility, physicians must distinguish between an effect
which is limited to some part of the patient's body, and a benefit
which appreciably improves the person as a whole. Treatment that fails to provide the latter is futile." They also
include in their definition of futility "therapy that merely
preserves permanent unconsciousness, that is the persistent
vegetative state." Thus these authors emphasize values in
their concept of "futility" by speaking of the goal of therapy,
by distinguishing a benefit from an effect, and by implying
their view of life without consciousness.
The term "futile," however, is too often misunderstood to
be simply a value-free probability statement. For example, I
have heard statements of these same authors taken out of
context: "When physicians conclude that in the last 100 cases
the medical treatment is useless, they should regard that
treatment as futile"; and "physicians can judge a treatment to
be futile, and are entitled to withhold a procedure on this
basis. Physicians need not obtain consent from patients or
family members."(1) Similarly, in an earlier paper John
Lantos and his colleagues of the Center for Clinical Medical
Ethics at the University of Chicago wrote, "Futile therapy is
merely the end of the spectrum of therapies with very low
efficacy. A physician is under no obligation to offer, or even
discuss, futile therapies."(2)
However, Lantos and colleagues bring us back to values or
goals: A decision to withhold therapy that is deemed futile,
like all treatment choices, must follow (first) judgment about
the chance of success of the therapy, and (second) consideration of the patient's goals for therapy." Thus they raise yet
another extremely important component of the concept of
"futility": the need to know the patient's as well as the
physician's goals for therapy in order to properly judge futility.
Even when one appreciates the value-dependency of the

*Ronald B. Miller, M.D., is Clinical Professor of Medicine
and Director of The Program in Medical Ethics, University
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concept of "futility," problems remain. Forexample, Virginia
Warren, a Professor of Philosophy at Chapman College in
California, points out, "The use of the word 'futile' begs the
question: that is, the word already has the conclusion within
it."(3) Perhaps a better term is "inappropriate" therapy, but
whichever term one uses, it is crucial that one judge both the
goal of therapy and the probability of success of the therapy.
Most would agree that the goal of therapy ought to be seen
from the viewpoint of the informed patient, and some would
say that the goal of therapy should be evaluated from the
physician's perspective as well. With regard to the probability
of success of the therapy, most would rely upon the physician
for that judgment, perhaps confirmed by the judgment of a
consultant physician.
What are the implications of a judgment of futility? The
first level of implication of a judgment of futility is that the
physician or institution is not obliged to offer a treatment that
would be futile. In the recent Annals paper,(1) that would
mean no success in the last 100 similar cases, or less than a two
percent chance of success. The next level of implication of a
judgment of futility is that the physician or institution may
withhold or withdraw therapy, and we are all familiar with the
fact that ethically it is felt there is no difference between
withholding or withdrawing therapy. Although withdrawing
is vastly more difficult psychologically for health-care workers
than withholding, it is ethically problematic for one to be
unwilling to withdraw therapy once instituted, since that
precludes a therapeutic trial. It forces the patient to decide in
advance, without trying the therapy, whether he would like it
or not, and to accept or refuse it, based on hunch or inadequate
information. The next level of implication of a judgment of
futility I find particularly problematic: that such a judgment
implies the physician is not obliged to discuss the possible
therapy with the patient. My argument that patients should
be informed is based on the belief that they have the right to
seek treatment from another physician or from another institution if the treatment they would wish to try is judged to be
futile. On the other hand, this argument could be extended
to absurdity, requiring a physician to review a litany of ineffective treatments every time a treatment decision were to be
made. The final level of implication of a judgment of futility
is that the physician or institution is obliged to withhold or
withdraw therapy irrespective of the patient's wishes. And
this leads us to appreciation of the importance of shared
3

decision-making; that is, the importance of the views of both
patients and physicians.
The table in Figure 1 compares what the patient wants with
what the physician judges to be effective or futile. In the
upper left-hand corner, when the patient wants a treatment
which the physician judges effective, of course the treatment
is provided. And in the bottom right-hand corner, when the
patient does not wish a treatment, and the physician judges
the treatment would be futile anyway, of course one does not
treat. The other two circumstances are problematic. In the
upper right-hand corner, when a patient does not wish therapy
but the physician judges it to be effective, sometimes the
. physician may force treatment, even by going to court. This
is particularly common in neonatology and in the care of
children when the surrogate refusal of the therapy is based
upon the parent's values which are not shared by all of society,
for example a Jehovah Witness parent's refusal of blood
transfusion for a child who would die without it, or a Christian
Science refusal of treatment. In the bottom left-hand corner
is the circumstance in which the patient wants treatment and
the physician judges it to be futile. I believe the basis for such
decision is commonly the strength of conviction of patient
and physician, the certainty of prognosis, and non-medical
. considerations such as cost. Even when the chance of success
is low, if the cost is also low (whether the cost is economic or
risk), the physician will often allow the patient to have his way
and not rarely the patient proves correct.
In Figure 2 the utility of therapy (that is the quantity of
benefit if the therapy is successful) is compared with the
probability of success of the therapy. In the upper left-hand
corner, when both are high, of course, one treats. Conversely,
in the bottom right-hand corner, when both are low, one does
not treat. The other two circumstances are again problematic,
and influenced by non-medical factors as well as by medical
factors. With regard to the latter, the medical factors, in the
upper right-hand corner when the benefit to be achieved is
relatively small but the probability of achieving that benefit
is high, one probably would treat. Similarly in the lower lefthand corner, when the benefit to be achieved is great even
though the probability of achieving it is small, once again,
probably one would treat.
Additional serious concerns about the concept of futility are
that the determination of futility may hide physician discretion or paternalism, may disguise social prejudice, or may
mask a resource allocation decision in the guise of a medical
judgment.
I will attempt to make these abstract comments about
futility concrete by applying them to the circumstance of

cardiopulmonary resuscitation. Leslie Blackhall of Boston
University wrote a landmark paper(4) concerning futility in
response to a poignant patient's plight and to increasing
evidence in the medical literature of the strikingly lower
success rate of cardiopulmonary resuscitation than originally
reported by Kouwenhoven(S) who had observed 70 percent
long-term survival following dosed-chest cardiac massage.
Blackhall stated, "Infrequently discussed is the situation in
which a patient wants CPR but the physician believes that it
is contraindicated. In these cases, patients almost invariably
remain full code." She went on to say, "Incases in which CPR
has been shown to be of no benefit, it should not be considered an alternative and should not be presented to the patient
as such,'" that is, as a viable alternative. In such cases
physicians could write, "This patient has a condition for
which CPR has been shown not to be effective. In case of
cardiopulmonary arrest, CPR should not be performed."
In a recent paper in the Journal of the American Medical
Association(6), Tomlinson and Brody spoke of the same sortof
case, one where CPR would be futile. They said, "No
reasonable person would pursue the low probability or quality
of survival that CPR offers in the kind of case at hand. This is
a social judgment of reasonableness," not an individual one.
Social judgments about the range and rational conception of
the good set the boundaries within which individual, instrumental rationality can competently operate."
Indeed, in Tomlinson's and Brody's earlier paper in the
New EnglandJournal ofMedicine(7), (but a later paper than that
of Blackhall) they discussed three types ofDNR, the first the
Blackhall type. This is, when the rationale for a DNR order
is that the patient cannot medically benefit, the patient's
values are irrelevant, and there is no implication of the DNR
order for any other medical treatment. In the second type of
DNR, where the rationale is a poor quality of life after CPR,
the patient's values are dearly relevant, but this type ofDNR
has again no implication for other treatment. In the third type
of DNR order, that where the rationale is a poor quality oflife
before CPR, obviously again the patient's values are relevant
and fundamental to the decision for the DNR, but furthermore this rationale has substantial implication for other treatment, which of course must be discussed with the patient or
his surrogate and appropriately limited.
Let me return to the first issue, that of a DNR order when
no medical benefit of CPR is perceived. Although Tomlinson
and Brody point out that such a judgment can be made
irrespective of the patient's values, I believe this is true only
when one is absolutely confident that CPR would not restore
life, for even brief restoration of life may be appropriate from
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the patient's point of view, if for example even another few
hours of life might allow him to visit with a relative coming
from out of town to his deathbed. I have maintained, as has
Stuart Youngner(8), that the physician does have an obligation to at least inform the patient that he does not intend CPR
should a cardiopulmonary arrest occur. He does not necessarily have to ask the patient for this permission, but he needs at
least to inform the patient so that if the patient believes the
judgment is incorrect he can try to so persuade the physician.
Once again, then, we are returning to the matter of the goals
of therapy and the possibility that the patient's goals may be
somewhat different from the physician's.
Tomlinson and Brody in their recent paper state, "The
mixed messages inherent in requesting patient consent to
withhold futile therapy serve to undermine rather than to
enhance autonomous choice."(6) Indeed, I agree with this,
but I do not believe it is equally true that informing the
patient that one is going to withhold futile therapy necessarily
undermines autonomous choice of the patient.
Indeed, I believe (though not all who have read their paper
focused on it) Tomlinson and Brody wisely went on to say,
"Our proposal would eliminate not discussion, but only the
use of the consent process as the context for discussion. An
ethically confused and misleading discussion focused on
consent would be replaced by more honest and appropriate
discussion focused on enhancing the patient's understanding
of the limits of medical intervention." (6) They further state,
"Although physicians should not offer futile resuscitation, in
most cases they should inform the patient or family that
resuscitation would be futile and should not be attempted,
explaining the medical facts that support that decision."
Finally, I wish to briefly relate the concept of futility to the
just allocation of resources. "Although care that is futile is also
not "cost-worthy," care that is not cost-worthy relative to
other uses of medical resources may still offer benefits to the
patient and so not be futile." (6) The Seattle group also states,
"Our notion of futility does not arise from considerations of
PROVONSHA, continuedfrompage 2
the unattractive ones too."
Being an agent of God makes it possible also to be an agent
for even unattractive patients. It may in fact be the only
possibility. Certainly that may be the case with those patients
whose contacts with us are so brief that we and they remain
strangers. To love in principle as an agent of God may be the
only basis for my being the stranger's agent. And of course
being thus able to remain patient-oriented protects me from

scarce resources. Arguments for limiting treatments on grounds
of resource allocation should proceed by an entirely different
route, and with great caution, in our open system of medical
care."(1)
Endnotes
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those other agency dominations which follow when patientagency is lost-that is, self-agency or government-agency.
Only on this basis will the physician of the future avoid
burying his patients in the burgeoning morass of inevitable
government red tape.
The doctrine of creation in which the creature is dependent
upon the Creator for his total existence provides a barrier to
that self-sufficiency which is the essence of self-agency. If
Continued on page 6
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one lives out one's life with a pervasive sense of stewardship
over all one has received from the Creator and employs his
gifts as one accountable to God, there is less possibility that
they will be turned in upon the self. Self-sufficiency is the
primal sin. It is the attempt to be God. Only the Creator is
self-sufficient-by definition. It was Lucifer's sin in heaven
and it was the temptation in the garden-and it is the growing
sin of physicians as they multiply their wizardry and gadgets.
We all know of course that in the ordinary practice of
medicine, members of our profession are frequently confronted with decisions that might more properly be placed in
the hands of someone all-knowing. But alas, the Omniscient
One has placed them in ours. We are also at times given power
over life that might seem more appropriate to the Omnipotent
One. But there is no escape. Use it we must. There is no one
else to whom to turn. So we sometimes seem to be playing
God-and it is only a short step from playing God to developing illusions about being God. To recall that we are creatures
can help us to carry such awesome responsibility with a
measure of humility.
It can also prevent us from surrendering our souls to other
creature-gods beyond ourselves. There may be no escaping
the increasing interference of governmental power in our
lives-and institutional power at all levels-but never must
such power be allowed to steal our souls, seal our lips, or sear
our consciences. Tangled up in red tape and institutional
directives we may be, but we stand responsibly before a
Creator Who is higher than any human structure. "Thou shalt
have no other Gods before me" is not a dead command. No
human institution must be allowed to come between me and

my carrying out my God-given task of acting for the good of
my patients.
Another implication of the doctrine of creation is the manner in which such a doctrine affirms the material world. When
God finished His work in the Genesis account, it is written
that He said of it, "It is very good." This included all that He
had made. That first Sabbath was a celebration of the
goodness of all of the creation-including man. Material
substance was good; the woods, the sky, animal life, maneven man's social order and functions-were pronounced
good. How often has the creature forgotten that truth as he
has devalued himself and polluted his environment!
Some thinkers even demeaned those professions whose
primary concern was that creation, including man's body.
Those celebrated Roman baths which were a hallmark of
Roman civilization were destroyed and repressed by Christian Rome as undue pampering of the body. The body was
always suspect by such Christians. The baths survived for a
time in the Islamic world, where the body was conceived of
differently-along, interestingly enough, with about all the
scientific medicine the world had to offer during that period.
The Christian emperor Justinian I closed down the medical
schools at Athens and Alexandria in the fifth century. To
many of his contemporaries, medicine was rejected as a
materialistic use of drugs and potions and therapies instead of
mystical things like prayers and religious incantations. Tatian
lodged a protest against the invasion of science. He regarded
it as not becoming to ascribe to matter the relief of the sick.
Monasticism carried this notion to its logical conclusion in its
denying of the body as a means to spiritual excellence. St.
Continued on page 8

Dear Friends:
I recently celebrated the 10th anniversary ofmy 7th birthday. Usually 3 score and 10 seems to wind life up formany septugenarians.
Not so for this one. I feel wound up for life. One ofthe things that really excites me is the work ofthe faculty that make up our Center
for Christian Bioethics. I am constantly amazed at how much our ethicists do, and at the many dreams they have and shore.
I would like to thank you for your interest, prayers andfor the generous gifts that many ofyou hove mode. It is your involvement
that makes our work at the Center possible. One of our dreams is to build our endowment up to a full $1 ,000,000 by the year 2000.
Our endowment is now at over $632,000. We would like to be close to the $700,000 mark by June 30, 1992.
I think you know what's coming next. Yes, I would like to ask for yourfinancial gift. Please make the largest possible gift that you
can to assist us in building our endowment. Ifthe options we provide in the enclosed return envelope are not ambitious enough, please
set our sights higher. As you well know, endowments and theirproceeds enable the Center to maintain and extend its activities without
hoving to depend strictly on operating support.
Our God is good to us. We thank Him for this. You are with us too. Thank you for your interest andfor your generous gift.
Shaluha,

~o...... Qv~.
Wil Alexander,
Dean, Faculty of Religion
Chairperson, Center for Christian Bioethics
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Hildegard wrote, "God rarely dwells in a healthy body," a
view, of course, tinged by a Gnostic-Manichean concept of
matter (and the body) as degenerate and evil. Such attitudes
forced scientific medicine to develop largely outside of the
church.
But if the body is God's creation and good, although it may
sometimes need assistance because some things have gone
awry in God's creation, quite another philosophy oftherapeutics emerges. There is an inherent "wisdom" in the body
placed there by the Creator. If the body for one reason or
another fails to live up to the Creator's design, it may require
assistance; but the assistance is only to the end that the body
may fulfill the Creator's intention. It is the role of the
physician who believes in the creation to cooperate with the
body's own "wisdom" -not merely to manipulate it according to his own.
Remember Ambrose Pare's statement of some 300 years
ago, "I dress the wound, God heals it"? This is, I think, the
sense of Ellen White's often-repeated expression, "natural
remedy." A "natural remedy" should be understood as any
remedy that cooperates with and assists nature in its Godgiven physiologic process-anything whatever, whether it
comes off a bush, out of a water tap, or an electric light socket,
or in a pill, an infusion bottle, from a machine, or involving the
skilled application of a scalpel. Does it respect the "wisdom"
of the body? That is the question. The doctrine of creation
prescribes that it must. (Obviously not all remedies are
unmixedly "natural" in this sense. There are often unwanted
side effects, but the principle still holds. A physician conditioned by respect for the body will choose agents according to
their greatest positive and least negative affects-while searching for better ones.)
Last but not least, a belief in the doctrine of creation will
also include that secondarysubs.et-re-creation-the subject
of soteriology. Anyone who takes creation seriously will also
be dedicated to the total restoration of man as nearly as
possible to the Creator's ideal. Since humanity's fall included
all of its dimensions-so must humanity's healing.
I submit that if our profession is going to retain those
qualities that have made it so powerful a force for good in the
world, and made it so exciting and appealing to us in those
idealistic days of our youth, as it undergoes agency transition
it must discover its true role as an agency of the divine Creator.
The concept of the physician as the Creator's agent provides for a truly patient-centered medicine in a world in
transition. It may also provide the physician with an escape
from functioning as profit-oriented agents of self-centeredness,
or of finally becoming merely the agents of impersonal governmental bureaucracy.
The physician as an agent of the Divine Creator is an idea
whose time not only has come but is long overdue. •
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